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Abstract
This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic
publications. Given imperfect information about journalseditorial line,
authors can sometimes target a wrong journal; in turn, the editor will
desk-reject their paper. An equilibrium is dened as a situation where
both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies,
given the matching technology and the prevailing surplus sharing rule.
The model can be solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection
rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors.
Keywords: Academic journals, Desk-rejection, Publishing, Matching,
Imperfect information.
JEL Classication : C78, A14.
1 Introduction
Since the very rst academic papers were published in 1665, their volume has
grown steadily to reach the astronomic gure of 1.3 million papers pear year
in 2006 (Jinha [2010]). Experts tend to agree that in the last two decades the
number of papers published in all elds of scientic research has increased by an
average annual rate of 3%, which is tantamount to a doubling time of 24 years
(Jinha [2010], Van Noorden [2010], Ware [2006]).
As a subset of all scientic publications, social sciences follow the general
pattern observed in science. The number of scholars committed to research
and the number of submitted papers in social sciences have increased dramati-
cally in the last twenty years. The acceleration of publication e¤orts was driven
Corresponding author. University Paris 13 and CEPN, 99 Av. Jean-Baptiste Clément,
93430 Villetaneuse, France. E-mail: besancenot.damien@univ-paris13.fr.
yUniversity Paris 2 and LEM, 92 rue DAssas, 75006 Paris, France. E-mail:
kim.besancenot@univ-paris2.fr
zESSEC Business School and THEMA, 105 Av. Bernard Hirsch, 95021 Cergy, France.
E-mail: vranceanu@essec.fr.
1
by both the regulatory changes implemented by governments pursuing an ac-
tivist policy of enhancing research (mainly in Europe, Asia and Australia), and
a stronger institutional race for top research positions in the now ubiquitous
rankings (Bence and Oppenheim [2004], Groot and Garcia-Valderrama
[2006], McGrail, Rickard, and Jones [2006], Frey [2009]).1 In turn, this
change in volumes brought about several signicant changes in the organization
of the publication market: rstly, the number of journal titles has also increased,
but at a smaller pace than the number of submitted papers, leading to higher
congestion. Secondly, while twenty years ago almost no journal charged sub-
mission fees, these days submission fees are almost generalized in economics,
accounting and nance; they vary from modest amounts, to quite substantial
ones.2 Thirdly, in the last few years, more and more journals are implementing
"desk-rejection procedures", according to which the editor can decide to turn
down a paper without sending it to referees, if he considers that the paper does
not t to the aim and scope of the journal (or that the paper is really poorly
written). The standard rationale is clearly stated in the Editor Report 2010 of
the American Economic Review :
Beginning in January 2006, the Editor and Coeditors have re-
served the right to return manuscripts to authors without referee
review. The decision to return a manuscript without review is based
upon a number of considerations, including expected probability of
meeting the standards of the Review, breadth of topic, interest to
the AER audience, and other factors.3
The aim of this paper is to provide a dynamic analysis of the academic pub-
lication market, dened as the place where scholars supply and editors demand
academic papers. In general, dynamic models are better tted to analyze ow
markets as compared to stock markets, for which static models provide satisfac-
tory explanations. Indeed, an important characteristic of the academic publica-
tion market is the huge ows of papers written, submitted, revised and rejected
every year, ultimately leading to a relatively small number of papers published.
As compared to a static model of the publication market (e.g.: Besancenot
and Vranceanu [2008]), the dynamic model presents several benets: rst, it
can take into account the informational frictions that are a main factor explain-
ing the new phenomenon of desk-rejection; second, it can trace the full history
of any paper and thus allows us to study the optimal decision of editors and
authors in a genuine intertemporal perspective; third, such a model can account
for various stages of one paper (submitted, desk-rejected, referee-rejected, ac-
cepted) and describe, if not explain, the transition mechanism from one stage
to another.
1 In a representative exemple, the Report of the Editor, January 2, 2010 of the American
Economic Review states that the number of submissions to the journal has increased from
641 in 1980 to 1398 in 2009. See: www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php.
2Azar (2005) reports on submission fees in a sample of important economic journals in
2003. By 2010 the majority of the surveyed journals have raised their fees: see Appendix 1.
3See for similar policies the Instructions to Authors web page of Econometrica, Journal of
Monetary Economics or the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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One key assumption is that academic journals are specialized or have their
own philosophy. Therefore, a good quality paper, well suited for one journal,
might not match the editorial line of another journal. In a world where the
number of journal titles in a given eld of social sciences counts in hundreds,
authors might target the wrong journal.4 If a paper does not match the editorial
line of journal, it will be desk-rejected; in the opposite case, it will be sent to
referees for an assessment of its quality. The traditional refereeing process is
then represented in a simplied way, by considering a xed probability of having
a paper accepted for publication. Hence, in this paper we focus on "horizontal"
di¤erentiation between identically demanding journals. The quality of the pa-
pers is not explicitly brought into the picture; the only assumption we made is
that authors of a referee-rejected paper realize that its quality is too low for the
going standards and will not send it to another journal. To the contrary, the
author of a desk-rejected paper will submit it to another journal, hoping for a
better t.
As an original contribution, we introduce at the editor pre-screening level a
matching function that connects the number of successful matches to the total
number of submitted papers and the number of journal titles. For sure, in a
market with horizontally di¤erentiated journals, the more papers each journal
gets, the larger the number of papers tted for that journal; the larger the num-
ber of journals, the deeper their specialization (Frey, Eichenberger, and
Frey [2009]), thus the better are chances for an author to target the right jour-
nal.5 Our approach builds on the classical analysis of the matching process,
that has been developed by labor economists. In this eld, the matching func-
tion between rms and job-seekers, pioneered by Pissarides [2000], connects
the number of successful matches to the number of unemployed persons and
vacant jobs.6 A journal in the academic publication market is thus similar to a
"large rm" in the labor market framework, given that every journal publishes
several papers every period. Thus, the paper-to-journal matching function can
be seen as a useful "macroeconomic" device, able to describe in a simple way
the informational frictions between authors and editors. In the recent years, the
matching model was used to analyze various other ow markets. In a somehow
related eld, Inderst and Muller [2004] have studied the matching equilib-
rium between inventors who have no resources but produce a constant ow of
projects and ideas, with venture capitalists who have the needed resources. The
later enter this market as long as they can make positive prots. A standard
matching function is used to explain the number of successful pairs formed each
period.
4For instance, the main producer of bibilometric statistics, Thomson ISI Web of Science
covers in 2010 about 10000 high impact journals, among which 2100 journals in social science.
5This argument has been put forward by Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland [1995] in a
di¤erent set-up. Taking the perspective of scholars searching for new ideas, they argue that
the normal reaction of congestion in publication market is journal specialization; this process
should reduce the readerse¤ort for identifying the relevant journals.
6The substantial contribution of Dale Mortensen to this literature should also be acknowl-
edged here (Mortensen [1994], Mortensen and Pissarides [1994]). See also Cahuc and
Zylberberg [2004] for a thorough description of the matching approach to labor markets.
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In our paper, the long-run equilibrium is dened as a situation where both
scholars and editors implement their optimal plans, given the prevailing match-
ing process and surplus sharing rule. The model has three key endogenous
variables: the desk-rejection rate, the degree of market openness, dened as the
ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors, and the sub-
mission fee. After showing that the model presents a single equilibrium, we will
analyze how changes in parameters impact the endogenous variables. Some of
these parameter changes can be related to policy implemented in the last few
years by many higher education institutions in order to strengthen the research
productivity of their scholars (McGrail, Rickard, and Jones [2006], Groot
and Garcia-Valderrama [2006]). The publication market is decentralized,
authors and editors cannot bargain on the surplus allocation. In this paper, the
relative shares of total surplus going to editors and respectively authors is taken
as given; however, we will be able to determine the Pareto-dominant surplus
sharing rule that maximizes the total welfare in this market.
While analyses of the academic publication market belong now to a well
established eld of research in economics, there are not many theoretical analy-
ses that take into account informational frictions specic to this market. As
a related work, we can refer to Besancenot, Faria, and Huynh [2009] who
worked out an equilibrium search model, where authors submit papers and edi-
tors search for papers. Editors can be either highly demanding, thus accepting
only top papers with a small probability, or tolerant, thus accepting all papers.
In equilibrium, authors optimally decide whether to write high or low quality
papers. Lee [2009] argues that matching frictions are a key feature of the pub-
lication market, enhanced by the rule according to which a paper cannot be
submitted to several journals at the same time. He works out a paper alloca-
tion model, similar to an equilibrium search model, and analyses the equilibria.
Large frictions in the market, leading to higher delays in publication, would
support an e¢ cient separating equilibrium where high-quality papers are pub-
lished by top-tier journals, and lower quality papers are published by second-tier
journals. Without providing a formal model, Pujol [2008] also acknowledges
that journals are vertically di¤erentiated, and, due to imperfect information, au-
thors can sometimes target a too high quality journal relatively to their work,
thus bearing a high risk of referee-rejection. At di¤erence with these existing
studies, in our model journals have identical qualities. This is the price to pay
for developing an explicit dynamic analysis of the matching process that is not
available elsewhere. If the model were generalized by allowing authors to write
either top quality papers or low quality papers, the referee rejection probability
could be made endogenous.7 Furthermore, editors would specialize, the most
demanding rejecting many papers and publishing a small number of top papers
(and some lower quality papers) and the others publishing a larger number of
lower quality papers (and some top quality papers).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the main
7See for such an endogenous screening mechanism, Enger and Gans [1998], Besancenot
and Vranceanu [2008] or Heintzelman and Nocetti [2009].
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assumption. Section 3 presents the equilibrium and study its main properties.
Policy implications are presented in Section 4. We present our conclusions in
the last section.
2 Main assumptions
2.1 Authors, papers and editors
At every period, each author writes one paper, and, following the standard rule
in academic publication, he submits it to only one journal. Submissions are
uniformly distributed over the existing journals. Each journal is run by one
editor. Authors have no perfect information about the editorial line of a journal
and therefore can target a wrong journal. Editors must decide whether to have
them published or not. The number of editors, denoted by E; is given. The
number of authors is denoted by A (with A  E). We assume that authors
can freely enter or exit this market, depending on their outside opportunities.
Hence A can vary (and will be endogenously determined).
We assume that the paper selection mechanism proceeds in two steps. In
the rst step, the editor must decide whether the paper matches the aim and
scope of the journal. If the match is not successful, the editor decides to desk-
reject the paper. The author will keep on submitting it to other journals until
a correct match occurs. If the match is successful, the editor will send it to
the referees for an assessment of its quality. A paper sent to referees actually
exits the submission process: after the referees deliver their verdict, the paper is
either published or withdrawn. We assume that all decisions require a standard
time period for processing and analysis.
Hence, in the steady state, the total number of papers submitted for pub-
lication each period does not vary. It is made up of the newly written papers
(in number A) and all the papers written at the previous periods that have not
yet reached a successful match. Let us denote the steady state number of sub-
missions by N and the probability for a submitted paper to match the editorial
line of a journal by (1 ); the steady state desk-rejection rate is . The steady
state number of submitted papers per period is related to the number of new
papers by a simple relationship:
N = A
1X
k=0
k =
A
1  : (1)
2.2 The matching function
We denote the per-period number of successful matches between authors and
editors by M . We assume that M can be written as a twice di¤erentiable
function with the general form M = M(E;N); with @M(; )=@E = ME > 0;
and @M(; )=@N = MN > 0: The rationale behind these properties is easy to
grasp: on the one hand, for a given number of journal titles, the more papers
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are submitted, the more papers per journal and the more of them should t
any of these journals; on the other hand, for a given number of papers, the
more journal titles, the greater specialization and the smaller will be chances to
target a wrong outlet. Furthermore, this matching function must comply with
one important restriction: the number of matches cannot exceed the number of
submitted papers: M(E;N)  N:
In this paper, in order to get an analytical solution, we will assume that the
matching function takes the specic form:8
M(E;N) = EN1  with  2]0; 1[: (2)
The matching probability (1  ) is then:
(1  ) = M(E;N)
N
=

E
N

=

E
A

(1  ) (3)
() (1  ) =

E
A
 
1 
: (4)
Equation (3) denes the matching probability by (1  ) = (N=E) ;  is the
opposite of the elasticity of the matching probability with respect to the number
of papers per editor. Ceteris paribus, an increase in  brings about a decrease
of the matching probability; hence,  can be interpreted as an indirect measure
of the informational frictions.
If we denote by  = E=A the degree of openness of the academic publication
market (a higher  being representative of an easier path to publication for an
author), with  2]0; 1[, then the matching probability (Eq. 4) can be written:
1   =  1  (5)
Another interesting measure is the number of submissions per journal :
N
E
=
A=E
1   =
1
(1  ) = 
  11  > 1: (6)
2.3 The expected intertemporal utility of the scholar, W
As already mentioned, at each time period, the scholar writes one paper and
submits it for publication to only one journal. Because of informational frictions
in the publication market, he will meet an editor interested in his work with
probability (1   ): When an editor gets a paper in line with the philosophy
of the journal, he will send it to external referees for a standard evaluation of
the quality of the text. To keep the model as simple as possible, we consider
that there are only two possible outcomes of the refereeing process: the paper
8The model could be numerically solved for any function homogenous of degree one
M(E; N) = M(E;N); 8 > 0. This property is intuitively appealing: indeed, doubling
the number of papers and the number of titles, it is reasonable to assume that the number of
matches would double.
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can either be referee-rejected with the probability (1  p); or accepted with the
probability p:9 Denoting by  the scholars discount factor (with  < 1), his
intertemporal expected utility prior to sending his paper to a journal is:
S = S + (1  ) f s+  [pWA + (1  p)WR]g : (7)
In this expression, the rst term is the expected gain if the match was unsuccess-
ful; in this case, that occurs with probability ; at the next period the scholar
will re-submit his paper to another journal and expect the same reward S. The
second term is the expected payo¤ if the match is successful (which happens
with probability (1   )): the scholar pays the submission fee s and waits for
the editors decision. The latter takes advice from referees, then either rejects
the paper, which worth then WR; or accepts it, which worth then WA for its
author.
When a paper is referee-rejected, the author must decide if he will try to
nd another suitable journal for his article. For the sake of parsimony, we
will consider here that after a motivated rejection, the paper is denitively
withdrawn from the publishing game by its author. Hence, the expected utility
of the author of a referee-rejected paper is: WR = 0:
Many theoretical and empirical analyses have shown that a scholars pay,
promotion and tenure decision depend to a large extent on his publication
record (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin [1992], Swidler and Goldreyer [1998],
Swanson [2004], Azar [2005]). Hence, we merely assume that the author gets
a positive intertemporal utility from publishing one additional paper: WA = u;
with u > 0:10
Then equation (7) can be solved for an explicit value of S:
S =
(1  ) ( s+ pu)
1   : (8)
Denoting the cost of drafting a new paper by c, the net expected intertemporal
value from writing a paper can be written:
W = S   c
=
(1  ) ( s+ pu)
1     c (9)
We notice that the problem is meaningful only for W > 0. The intertemporal
utility of the author is a decreasing function in the submission fee s:
2.4 The expected intertemporal utility of the editor, V
At any time period, each editor gets N=E submissions. At a the rst stage of
the selection process, each paper is screened by the editor. Given the matching
9The structure of the model would not change if we consider a two stage evaluation process,
with a "revise and resubmit" option, followed by accepted or rejected.
10Here we assume that the utility from every new publication is constant. Paul and Rubin
[1984] argue that, for signaling motives, the value of the rst publications should be larger
than the value of subsequent ones.
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process dened here-above,M=E papers match the aim and scope of the journal
and will be sent to referees; the remaining (N   M)=E papers will be desk
rejected. The e¤ort of screening one paper involves a cost g for the editor. To
keep the paper as simple as possible, we assume that the editor has the same
discount factor as the author,  < 1:
Denoting by VDR the expected utility of a desk rejected paper, and by VS
the expected utility of a paper sent to the referees, the expected intertemporal
payo¤ of the editor (from being in the publication market) can be written as:
V =  gN
E
+
M
E
VS +
N  M
E
VDR: (10)
The value of a desk-rejected paper is elementary VDR = 0: When the editor
decides to send the paper to referees, he will charge the author a submission fee
s > 0. At the next period, he will reward the referees with a fee r  0 and,
according to the refereesreports, he will either accept the paper (and get the
payo¤ VA) or reject it (and receive VR). The expected utility VS of a paper sent
to the referees can be written:
VS = s+  [pVA + (1  p)VR   r] : (11)
The intertemporal utility of the editor from an accepted paper is VA = v and
the intertemporal utility of the author from a referee-rejected paper is VR = 0:
Thus, the expected intertemporal payo¤ of the editor (Eq.10) becomes:
V =  gN
E
+
M
E
VS
=
N
E

 g + M
N
[s+  (pv   r)]

=
N
E
f g + (1  ) [s+  (pv   r)]g : (12)
where we recall that (N=E) =  1=(1 )) and (1  ) = =(1 ). The editors
intertemporal surplus is increasing with s.
3 Main relationships and the equilibrium
3.1 Author free entry condition and the s = () relation-
ship
In general, people who can play the publication game are highly trained indi-
viduals who can use their human capital for alternative activities. For instance,
in many higher education institutions, faculty members, at some stage of their
career, choose to teach more hours in executive education programmes or do
administrative work. If the reward from academic publication increases, some
of them might be tempted to reduce their teaching or administration hours
and do more research (Fox and Milbourne [1999], Taylor, Fender, and
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Burke [2006]). Consulting or nice jobs in public administration or international
organizations are also accessible to many leading scholars (Faria [2001], [2002])
In our model, these outside opportunities provide the would-be author with a
reservation intertemporal utility level, denoted by W (with W > 0): Under free
entry, new authors enter the publication market as long as they expect that the
intertemporal gain from this activity is larger than W , and leave the market in
the opposite case. In the steady state equilibrium, the expected intertemporal
utility W is driven to W . The condition W = W allows us to write a rst
relationship between the openness degree,  = E=A; and the submission fee, s:
Given the denition of W (Eq. 9), we can write:
W = W
, (1  ) f s+ pug
1     c =
W
, s = pu    W + c h(1  )   1  + i : (13)
Denoting by  () = pu    W + c h(1  )  =(1 ) + i ; the last equation
can be written in the compact form:
s = () : (14)
with @ () =@ > 0; @2 () =@2 < 0 and lim
!0
() =  1; (1) = pu   
W + c

: Given that W + c = S such as dened by Eq. (8); we can check that
(1) > 0:
The graph of () is plotted in Figure 1:
Recall that authorsintertemporal utility W is decreasing with s: All points
above the line s = () correspond to situations where the intertemporal gain
of a scholar is lower than W , thus scholars are attracted by non academic ac-
tivities and exit the publication market. The number of authors decreases and
 increases. In turn, given equation (5), (1  ) increases and the probability
of desk rejection  declines.
Points below the line correspond to an authors intertemporal utility greater
than W , thus some new scholars decide to enter the publication market. Over
time the number of authors A increases and the openness degree  = E=A
decreases .
3.2 The rent sharing rule and the s = 	() relationship
In a normally functioning publication market, the representative author obtains
the intertemporal utility W from writing a paper and the representative editor
gets the intertemporal utility V from running his journal:With A authors and E
editors in the market, the overall welfare 
 generated by the publication market
is:

 = EV +AW (15)
9
Figure 1: The author free-entry condition
How this total welfare is divided between the two types of players is a matter of
social organization of this special market, prevailing institutional arrangements
and ultimately the balance of powers between the two groups of players. The
market is decentralized, authors and editors cannot bargain on the surplus al-
location. In the following we merely assume that editors gets a share  of the
total surplus while authors gets a share (1  ). In other words, we can write
that:
EV = 
 and AW = (1  )
: (16)
This surplus sharing rule allows us to write:
EV
AW
=

(1  ) () V =

(1  )
A
E
W: (17)
But in the long run equilibrium W = W: Hence, the former equation becomes:
V =

(1  )
A
E
W
() N
E
( g + (1  ) (s+  [pv   r])) = 
(1  )
A
E
W
() s = 
(1  )
W    [pv   r] + g  1  : (18)
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Denoting by 	() = (1 ) W   [pv   r]+ g =(1 ); the last equation can be
written in the compact form:
s = 	() ; (19)
with @	()=@ < 0; @	2()=@2 > 0; and lim
!0
	() = +1; 	(1) = (1 ) W  
 [pv   r] + g:
Figure 2 represents the graph of 	() :
Figure 2: The rent sharing rule
Recall that editorsintertemporal utility V is increasing with s: All points
below the curve s = 	() represent situations where editorsreward EV is too
low relatively to scholarsutility AW ; to restore the balance, the submission fee
is expected to rise. All points above the curve s = 	() correspond to situations
where the submission fee must decline to restore the socially agreed balance of
welfare shares.
3.3 The steady state equilibrium
An equilibrium solution is a pair (s; ) with s > 0 and  2]0; 1[ that simulta-
neously fullls equations s = () > 0 (the free entry condition, Eq. 14) and
s = 	() > 0 (the surplus sharing condition, Eq. 19). Such an equilibrium is
represented as the point Z in Figure 3.
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The equilibrium degree of openness  is implicitly dened by 	() =  () :
We can obtain its explicit form:
	() = ()
() pu    W + c h + (1  )   1  i = 
(1  )
W    [pv   r] + g  1 
()  =
24   W + c (1  ) + g
p (u+ v)   (r + c) 

 + 1 

W
35
1 

: (20)
The equilibrium matching probability (1  ) results from equation (5):
1   =  1  = (1  )
 
W + c

+ g
p (u+ v)   (r + c) 

 + (1 )

W
: (21)
The equilibrium number of submissions per journal (Eq. 6) can also be inferred
in a straightforward way:
N
E
=  
1
1  =
24p (u+ v)   (r + c) 

 + 1 

W 
W + c

(1  ) + g
35
1

: (22)
Finally, the equilibrium submission fee is:
s =

(1  )
W    [pv   r] + g  1 
() s =
 
W + c

(1  )
h

(1 ) W    (pv   r)
i
+ g
 
pu  c  W  
W + c

(1  ) + g :(23)
A single equilibrium exists under the necessary and su¢ cient condition:
	(1) < (1), 
(1  )
W    [pv   r] + g < pu    W + c
, 1
(1  )
W + r + g + c < p (u+ v) : (24)
Chances that this condition is fullled are better if direct and opportunity cost
of each player are relatively small, or if the utility from publishing a paper for
either the author or the editor is large enough.
The implicit dynamics represented by the arrows in Figure 3 show that the
model presents a Cobweb structure. A su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium
to be locally stable is that the curve () be steeper than 	() (in this case,
oscillations dampen around the equilibrium). It turns out that [ds=d] >
  [ds=d]	 ,
 
W + c

(1  ) > g: Chances to have this condition fullled
improve if the cost of managing papers by the editor is relatively low, and if
authors direct (c) and indirect opportunity cost
 
W

of writing papers are large.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium in the academic publication market
3.4 Properties of the equilibrium
We can now analyze the impact of changes in the main parameters on the
equilibrium values of s,  and . For so doing, we have to take into account
the impact of parameter changes on the two curves, s = () and s = 	().
Table 1 presents the partial derivatives @	(; i)=@i and @(; i)=@i; for i 2
fr; c; p; v; u; g; W; ; ; g: The signs of these derivatives can be inferred without
ambiguity11 :
11Signs of the derivatives with respect to  are inferred from a standard participation
constraint, if the expected gain is larger than the expected cost, neither the editor nor the
author participate to this market. Notice that 1   =(1 ) < 1; so pu >   W + c) pu > 
W + c

[1   =(1 )]:
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parameter i @( )=@i @	( )=@i
r 0 
c  
h
(1  )   1  + 
i
0
p u  v
v 0  p
u p 0
g 0  

1 
W  

(1  )   1  + 


(1 )
 0 1(1 )2 W
 1 
 
W + c

(1  )   11   


1 

g 
1
1 
 pu    W + c 1    1  > 0 (r   pv) < 0
Table 1. Various partial derivatives
We represent in Figure 3 how the two curves move in response to positive
variations of the parameters

r; c; p; v; u; g; W; ; ; 
	
by the respective arrows.
Table 2 indicates the sign of the variation in the equilibrium values of the
openness degree ; the desk-rejection rate ; and the submission fee s; with
respect to variations in parameters such as indicated by comparative statics
with the two relationships in Figure 3 (or directly from Eq. 20 and Eq. 23).
r c p v u g W   
 + +    + + +  
   + + +    ? +
s +  ?  + + ? + ? ?
Table 2. Impact of parameter changes on equilibrium values of ;  and s.
3.5 The Pareto-dominant surplus share
This sensitivity analysis allows us to address one important issue: what surplus
sharing rule brings about the highest total welfare? Such a Pareto-dominant
rule would be the outcome of centralized negotiations between authors as a
group and editors as a group. In a decentralized market, the share of surplus
going to editors () is the outcome of the relative balance of powers between
authors and editors, and is probably di¤erent from the social optimal share.
The rent sharing rule (Eq. 16) and the free-entry condition W = W allow
us to write the total surplus as:

 =
1
1  A
W = [(1  ) ()] 1E W; (25)
where E and W are given. The derivative of the total surplus 
 with respect
to  is:
d

d
= E W

()  (1  ) 0()
[(1  ) ()]2 : (26)
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The rst order condition d
d = 0 is equivalent to:
() = (1  ) 0(): (27)
With the equilibrium degree of openness  dened by Eq. (20), after some
calculations, we get the optimal share:
 =


p (u+ v)  (r + c)  W     1   W


p (u+ v)  (r + c) + (1  ) W  : (28)
In order to make sure that  corresponds to a maximum value of 
, we can
check that for  < , d
=d > 0; and for  > , d
=d < 0:
We notice that the optimal share is always smaller than one:  < 1: In
other words, a market organization where editors get the whole surplus cannot
be a social optimum.
4 From theory to policy
Comparative statics with parameters such as presented in Figure 3 and Table 2
can be related to various structural and institutional changes that occurred in
the publication market in the last years. In many regions of the globe (mainly
Europe, Asia and Australia), governments are implementing reforms aiming
to strengthen ties between academicscompensation and their research perfor-
mance (Groot and Garcia-Valderrama [2006], McGrail, Rickard, and
Jones [2006]). In Europe, substantial momentum to the reform of higher ed-
ucation and R&D systems was brought by the Lisbon Summit of 2000, where
leaders of the EU member countries acknowledged that lasting growth can be
achieved only if research performance in these two areas improves in a substan-
tial way. Out of the realm of public regulation, the emergence of ubiquitous
rankings of higher education institutions is setting additional pressure on deans
to reward research performance more aggressively.12 The direct consequence
of these institutional changes is an increase in scholarsutility from publishing
a paper (u). According to our analysis, when the net utility u of the author
from publishing a paper increases, their expected intertemporal gainW goes up.
New scholars are thus attracted into the publication market and start submit-
ting papers, the openness degree  = E=A declines. The rise in the number of
submissions presents an adverse e¤ect on the editorsutility as it brings about
an increase in the editorsoverall screening cost that is not fully compensated by
the bigger number of published papers. To restore the agreed shares of surplus,
the submission fees must increase in order to o¤set the relative decline in editors
surplus V . This partially o¤sets the initial rise in authorsintertemporal gain
W: In the steady state, at the term of the adjustment process, the submission
fee s has increased, the openness degree  has decreased and the number of sub-
missions per journal has gone up. These implications of the model are much in
12See Devinney, Dowling, and Perm-Ajchariyawong [2008] for a survey of business
schools rankings.
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line with the observed stylized facts. Indeed, as mentioned in the Introduction,
in the last few years the number of submitted papers has increased dramatically;
many journals are introducing submission fees or push up existing fees.
Subject to an ever growing ow of papers, editors might increase the submis-
sion response time just in order to prompt authors to self-select or make higher
e¤orts when choosing their target journal (Leslie [2005], Azar [2005], [2006]).
In our set-up, an increase in the response time is tantamount to a declining
discount factor : If the discount factor diminishes, the intertemporal utility
of the scholars declines and some of them will leave the market; in turn the
openness degree  will rise. Since it becomes now more di¢ cult for editors to
get papers, their utility W falls as well. The submission fees s might increase
or not, depending on the prevailing surplus sharing rule.
The model suggests that some other factors, such as a lower probability
of the referees accepting papers, a higher writing cost or an increased editors
power might also o¤set the rising volume of publications. For instance, Ellison
[2002] argues that over time referees tend to become more demanding. If the
probability p of accepting a paper is reduced, both the editors and the scholars
can expect a deterioration of their respective surpluses. If some authors leave
the publication market,  goes up and and the probability of desk rejection
declines. At the same time, a smaller number of submissions entails a smaller
editorial processing cost. Depending on the relative strength of the two e¤ects
(on the one hand, a smaller number of publications per journal pushes down the
editors expected reward, on the other hand, the falling number of submissions
brings down the editorial cost), editors would see their surplus raising or not and
would adjust submission fees accordingly. In the same line of reasoning, in order
to comply with a tougher publishing norm, authors might have to bear larger
writing costs (c). This would also push some authors out of the publication
market and help containing the raise in submission fees.
In the early years of the publication market, paper publication was mainly
driven by a concern of serving the academic community. Indeed, in the early
years of the 19th century, most academic journals were published by national
and regional associations of scholars. Over time, prot-driven businesses have
gradually taken o¤ the academic publication market and market concentration
raised over time, to be dominated now by a few major publishing houses (Goel
and Faria [2007]). Such institutional change could be responsible for a change
in the surplus sharing rule in favour of the editors . If the balance of power
between editors and authors changes such as a bigger share of the surplus goes
to editors ( goes up), the submission fee must increase. In turn, since W < W;
some scholars leave the publication market, the openness degree  will increase
and so will do the matching probability (1   ). Given that it becomes now
easier for authors to have their papers published, that evolution partially o¤sets
the initial increase in fees. At the term of the adjustment process, both s and
 would have risen.
Finally, note that the editorial strategy of academic journals may also a¤ect
the market equilibrium. For instance, in case of a general increase in journals
specialization, it becomes easier for researchers to target the "right" journal
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and informational frictions decrease ( declines). Desk-rejection should fall,
scholarsutility would rise and the publication market would attract more re-
searchers. For a given submission fee s, the market openness  rises. Editors
get and publish more papers, thus their utility edges up as well. The evolution
of the submission fees depends on the surplus sharing rule, it might increase
or decrease. A higher submission fee might partially o¤set the direct positive
e¤ect on authorsutility.
5 Conclusion
For many years now, the ow of papers submitted for publication in academic
journals has been increasing steadily. The number of journal titles is also grow-
ing, but at smaller pace. The resulting journal congestion is at the origin of
substantial frustration and criticism on behalf of both authors and editors. In
this context, editors are testing new strategies aimed to preserve the quality
of their journals and attract the best contributions. Among these new intrigu-
ing policies, one can mention the generalization of (large) submission fees, the
lengthier response time to submissions and the implementation of desk-rejection,
dened as the possibility for the editor to decide on his own whether a paper
matches or not the aim and scope of the journal.
This paper aimed at providing a dynamic model of the academic publication
market where scholars supply and journals demand papers. A dynamic model
has its own merits, since it can describe in a more thorough way a market char-
acterized by huge ows, such as the market for academic publications. In our
model, due to imperfect information, scholars can sometimes target a "wrong"
journal in terms of editorial line. The key and original modeling device is a
paper-to-journal matching function, relating the number of successful matches
to the numbers of authors and journals in the market, inspired from the classical
matching model in labor economics (Pissarides [2000]). If a paper overcomes
this rst test, then the editor will send it to referees who ultimately decide
whether to publish it or not.
The model presents a single equilibrium, dened as a situation where both
editors and authors implement their optimal publishing strategies, given the
matching process and the prevailing surplus sharing rule. Parameter changes
have in general unambiguous consequences on the main endogenous variables:
the ratio between the number of editors and authors (referred to as the openness
degree), the number of submissions per editor, the desk rejection rate and the
submission fee. In the light of our analysis, the recent trends in the market for
publication such as the simultaneous increase in submission fees and number of
submissions can be interpreted as a direct consequence of the rise in authors
utility from publishing a paper, itself related to the recent institutional changes
in the academic publication market.
One interesting extension allowed us to infer the Pareto-dominant surplus
sharing rule, to be reached under a collective bargaining process between the
group of authors and the group of editors. In a decentralized market, this
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social optimum would be reached only by chance. Furthermore, our analysis
has shown that editorsexcessive market power, leading to a very high editor
surplus share cannot be the social optimal. The excessive concentration of
the publisher market might come with this risk. If the government does not
have the information needed to regulate this market, at least it can encourage
the emergence of centralized negotiations between associations of authors and
editors with respect to submission fees.
Like the elementary version of the labor market matching model, our simple
model cannot claim to provide an exhaustive picture of the academic publication
market, but can be seen as a good starting point for more powerful analyses,
where the introduction of heterogenous agents or a more active role for editors
in the paper selection process could bring the model closer to reality. Further
research with a calibrated version of this theoretical model including an explicit
time dimension would allow to disentangle between the short and the long-run
response of the publication market to any reform, thus providing policymakers
with a useful tool for policy simulation and evaluation.
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6 Appendix1. Submission fees to selected jour-
nals, 2003 and 2010
Data on 2003 were taken by Azar (2005) from the journalswebsites. Data on
2010 were taken by authors on journalswebsites.
Submission fee
members/subscribers
Submission fee
others
2003 2010 2003 2010
Economics Journals
AER $75 $100 $150 $200
Econometrica $0 $0 $0 $0
Economica $0 $0 $40 $49
Economic Inquiry $100 $120 $160 $180
Intl. Econ. Review $55 $65 $120 $125
J. Econ. Theory $0 $0 $0 $0
J. Labor Econ. $0 $0 $0 $0
J. Math. Econ. $0 $0 $0 $0
J. Monetary Econ. $100 $100 $175 $175
JPE $50 $75 $50 $125
QJE $0 $0 $0 $0
RAND J. Econ $50 $85 $85 $100
REStat $0 $0 $50 $60
REStud $0 $0 $0 $0
Southern Econ. J. $50 $50 $75 $110
Accounting Journals
The Accounting Rev. $75 $200 $100 $400
J. Acc. & Econ. $250 $400 $300 $450
J. Accounting Res. $200 $400 $200 $400
Finance Journals
J. Finance $70 $70 $140 $140
J. Financial Econ. $400 $500 $450 $550
Rev. Financial Stud. $125 $200 $175 $260
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